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Deciding how to allocate the resources to be spent on promoting health
and safety through governmental regulation is a challenging task of
immense significance. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that
roughly $250 billion (2.6% of Gross National Product) will be spent on
pollution abatement alone in the year 2000.1 Billions more are spent on a
wide array of other health and safety measures. Tens of thousands of lives
will be lost or saved depending on whether these allocations are made
foolishly or wisely.2
In 1986, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) economist John
Morrall devised a now-famous table designed to assess the desirability of
an array of federal health and safety regulations Morrall concluded that
roughly half of the forty-four regulations he reviewed were unsound
because the cost per life saved exceeded $26.8 million in 1998 dollars -a
f Professor of Law and John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law
School. My thanks to Bernard Black, Richard Craswell, Jim Salzman, and Peter Siegelman for
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this work.
1. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. EcON. LITERATURE 132, 140 (1995).
Since 1970, these regulations have reduced carbon monoxide and particulate emissions by over
50% and lead emissions by 98%. See id. at 134 tbl.1. A question exists as to whether better
regulations could have given us the same, or even greater, benefits at only a fraction of the cost.
2. See John F. Morrall I, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 30
tbl.4.
3. See id. at 25.
4. Figure derived from converting $17.1 million cost per life saved for benzene regulations to
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figure substantially higher than the amount of money that workers would
demand in exchange for a comparable increased risk of death on the job.5
In her provocative article, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,6
Lisa Heinzerling illustrates how "the table" has taken on a life of its own as
it has become "Exhibit A" 7 in the case against the soundness of current
regulatory decisionmaking. She documents how the table has been widely
cited for the propositions that "the costs of regulation often exceed its
benefits, that many more cost-effective strategies exist for reducing risk,
that regulation sometimes increases overall risk, and that regulatory
priorities are not set in a rational manner." 8
Heinzerling has selected a marvelous topic and has exhaustively probed
beneath the surface of a widely accepted study to see if its conclusions can
withstand close scrutiny. She has taken Morrall's very lean report and
admirably fleshed out the details behind many of the forty-four regulations
that each appear as just one line in Morrall's table. Heinzerling legitimately
questions whether Morrall's selection of regulations is representative or
overweighted toward less cost-effective rules.9 She demonstrates that
Morrall's cost and benefit estimates. are not always well-documented and
are consistently less optimistic than the estimates of the agencies issuing the
rules,"0 and she observes that a number of the worst-performing regulations
on Morrall's list were withdrawn or never adopted because their costs far
exceeded their benefits.1 By accounting for these factors, Heinzerling
suggests that only eleven of the forty-four regulations reviewed by Morrall
are cost-ineffective, rather than twenty-two, as Morrall claimed.12
Ascertaining that only 25% of federal regulations were defective would
be an interesting conclusion-although perhaps not the ringing
endorsement of regulatory policy that Heinzerling seeks. Heinzerling
attempts, however, to further whittle the number of cost-ineffective
regulations from eleven to two. She argues that Morrall improperly uses a
1998 dollars. See id. at 30 tbl.4.
5. See id. at 34.
6. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998).
7. aId at 1994.
8. l at 1983.
9. See id. at 2000-17.
10. See id. at 2017-42.
11. See id. at 2000-10. Heinzerling notes the irony of including examples of unwise rules that
were rejected in a table that is held up as an indication of severe regulatory failure. Her criticism
of Morrall on this point seems a bit uncharitable, however, since his table explicitly identifies
whether regulations were implemented, rejected, or merely proposed. Moreover, the process that
led to the withdrawal of these regulations included procedures that Heinzerling would eliminate-
OMB review and consequent sharp criticism of rules that severely failed a cost-benefit test.
12. See id. at 1998-2014. Indeed, by relying on agency estimates that are uniformly more
favorable than Morrall's, Heinzerling concludes that even fewer than eleven of these regulations
are cost-ineffective. See id. at 1985. My guess is that if she had examined the agency estimates
with the same critical eye that she used for examining Morrall's figures, Heinzerling could have
raised many questions about their accuracy and consistency as well.
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10% discount rate to determine the cost per life saved of government
regulation, and she instead proposes a discount rate of zero. She even
suggests that cost-benefit analysis should be jettisoned altogether. These
arguments go too far. Had Heinzerling been content to make the case that
10% is too high a discount rate and that some lower but still positive
discount rate should be used, her work would have made a major
contribution to the literature. But by arguing that the quantification
involved in cost-benefit analysis is harmful and that discounting future
benefits is wrong, Heinzerling has impaired the value of her paper.
This Correspondence makes the following points: (1) cost-benefit
analysis is a useful tool for improving the quality of regulatory
decisionmaking; (2) whether one evaluates regulations using either the cost
per life saved approach-so-called cost-effectiveness analysis--or instead
uses standard cost-benefit analysis, one should discount future benefits
using a reasonable discount rate or a range of rates; and (3) if Morrall is
guilty of exaggerating the unattractiveness of many regulations, then
Heinzerling is equally guilty of exaggerating their desirability by failing to
discount future benefits. Following Heinzerling's advice to avoid
discounting and cost-benefit analysis generally would likely undermine
rational decisionmaking, thereby increasing the number of misguided
regulations and increasing overall risk.
I. THE VALUE OF COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS
Heinzerling suggests that numbers will be too persuasive and that we
should therefore jettison the whole enterprise of cost-benefit analysis. 3 This
seems a hasty judgment of a tool designed to promote wise decisionmaking.
Requiring agencies to set forth the relevant costs and benefits carefully
helps them to rationalize their regulatory agenda and enables independent
analysts to evaluate the soundness of particular regulations. Just as the
practice of requiring judges to explain their decisions improves the quality
of judicial decisionmaking, the requirement that agencies systematically
consider and document the effects of their decisions will improve the
quality of agency decisionmaking. Light is the best germicide-and all that.
This is why a distinguished panel of economists has set forth guidelines
calling on agencies to "spell out all key assumptions clearly and highlight
uncertainties" in conducting cost-benefit analyses of major regulations."
This should be the message that academics convey to our regulators,
politicians, judges, and citizens.
13. See id. at 2042, 2064-69.
14. KENNETH J. ARRoW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENvIRONMENTAL, HEALTH,
AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 12 (1996).
1999] 1903
The Yale Law Journal
While cost-benefit analysis can aid the regulatory process, however, its
limitations must be acknowledged. Judgment must still be exercised across
a vast array of issues, such as distributional concerns, possible irreversible
consequences, and the treatment of considerations not easily susceptible to
quantification. Moreover, the process is impaired when advocates for or
against regulation present biased estimates, as they typically do. 5 Two
steps that should improve the quality of federal regulations are the 1997
congressional directive that the OMB begin reviewing all new federal
regulations, and the creation of the new Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.
The Center, jointly sponsored by the conservative American Enterprise
Institute and the liberal Brookings Institution, provides independent cost-
benefit analyses of big-ticket federal regulations each year. 6 This promises
exactly the type of peer review that has so often been lacking.
While Heinzerling points to immensely wide-ranging estimates of the
costs and benefits of particular regulations as evidence against Morrall's
view of a chaotic regulatory process, 7 the estimates convey to me the need
for as much order, consistency, and quantification as possible. The idea that
better decisions could be obtained by keeping the picture more "blurry," as
Heinzerling suggests, 8 is baffling. The adoption of Heinzerling's approach
would needlessly sacrifice lives.
II. THE NEED To DISCOUNT FUTURE BENEFITS
To evaluate a proposed regulation, one would ideally like to ascertain
all of the relevant costs and benefits and identify when each would be
incurred. Since "[b]oth economic efficiency and intergenerational equity
require that benefits and costs experienced in future years be given less
weight in decisionmaking than those experienced today," 9 the process of
discounting the future costs and benefits to current dollars has become
standard.20 Expressing all costs and benefits in current dollars should yield
valuable information about the wisdom of adopting a particular proposal.
Discounting the monetary value of future lives embodies the
15. As Robert Litan, an economist at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, puts it: "The only comments regulators generally get are self-
interested comments." Peter Passell, A New Project Will Measure the Cost and Effect of
Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at D2 (quoting Robert Litan).
16. See id.
17. See Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 2041 n.404. For example, she notes that the estimates of
cost per life-year saved by regulating low-arsenic copper smelters range from $2.6 million to $890
million.
18. Il at 2069.
19. ARROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 13.
20. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER ExECuTIvE ORDER 12866, at 9-11
(1996) [hereinafter 1996 OMB ANALYSIS].
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assumption that if you had a choice between spending $40 million to save
either ten lives today or ten lives in a little over seven years, you would
choose to save the ten lives today. Concern for lives in the future would be
better addressed by investing the $40 million today, which, at a 10%
interest rate, would grow to $80 million in approximately seven years. This
larger sum could then be used to save more than ten lives. While human
lives are priceless from a philosophical or religious perspective, the
resources that can be used to save lives are limited. If we fail to recognize
this economic reality as we go about the process of choosing regulations,
we will expend resources in a way that prevents us from saving as many
lives as possible. It is not the idea that future lives are less valuable in any
moral or ethical sense that leads to the process of discounting at a current
rate of interest. Rather, discounting is appropriate in that, if invested, our
resources are expected to grow at that rate, so that if we forego spending
and invest the money instead, we can save more lives in the future with the
amount foregone today.21
In addressing the propriety of discounting, Heinzerling draws an
untenable distinction between the appropriate use of discounting in
traditional cost-benefit studies and Morrall's use of a discount rate in
implementing his cost-per-life-saved approach.22 Heinzerling argues that
since Morrall did not express a monetary value of life, he should not
discount the future lives saved by the regulations he evaluates.'
But if it is appropriate to discount in the traditional cost-benefit
analysis, then it is also appropriate for Morrall to have done so in his cost-
per-life-saved approach. The two are mathematically equivalent.24
Heinzerling improperly draws rhetorical support for her position-that we
should not "discount" lives saved in the future-by invoking the layman's
21. Of course, as Heinzerling notes in her reply, one needs to discount the future benefits to
generate a determinate outcome, otherwise any expenditure that would generate a savings of one
life each year in perpetuity would necessarily be deemed to have an infinite benefit juxtaposed
against the finite cost.
22. See Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 2043 ("As long as the value of human life is measured
in dollars, the justification for discounting remains .... If lives are commensurate with dollars-
the premise of the monetary valuation of a human life-then there appears to be little reason to
object, in principle, to the idea of discounting the monetary equivalent of a human life, just as
there is little reason to object to the idea of discounting any future sum of money to present
value.").
23. See id. at 2044-46. Heinzerling also argues that it may be appropriate to discount future
costs but not future benefits, see id. at 2052-53, but this claim is irrational. It would argue that we
should spend lots of money to save lives in the distant future even though we would not spend that
same amount to save a similar number of lives right now.
24. To see this, consider a regulation that would impose a $4 million cost today while saving
one future life, which is valued at $5 million at the time it is saved. Without discounting, the
regulation looks appealing, but if the present value of the life saved is only $2.5 million with
discounting, the regulation would fail the cost-benefit test. A cost-per-life-saved approach would
generate the same negative conclusion if we discounted the one life saved to one-half of a life, but
would lead to a more positive assessment if we failed to discount and deemed the cost per life
saved to be only $4 million.
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notion of discounting as somehow devaluing future lives, rather than the
analyst's conception of it as a tool to convert all costs and benefits into a
single present value calculation. Yet it is only the happenstance that Morrall
employed a cost-per-life-saved calculation that enables Heinzerling to
marshal this rhetorical opposition.' In this sense, the rhetoric about
"discounting lives" is a mere distraction, since traditional cost-benefit
analysis would simply be discounting dollars.
I1. CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE SOCIAL DIscouNT RATE
Heinzerling would have done a great service if she had simply argued
for a lower discount rate and shown how the use of a high discount rate
(like Morrall's) systematically discourages regulations that will control
diseases with long latency periods. While a zero discount rate is clearly too
low, a 10% real discount rate may be almost as evidently too high.26
As it turns out, there is no single correct answer to the choice of the
appropriate discount rate for public projects. The return on marginal
resources invested in the corporate sector is artificially elevated because of
the presence of corporate income taxes and a private risk premium that
attaches even though there is no risk from the perspective of society as a
whole. At the same time, the public's time discount rate is substantially
lower-perhaps proxied by the riskless government bond interest rate.
Efficiency in allocating resources between the public and private sectors
would argue for the higher discount rate reflective of returns in the private
sector, while efficiency in intertemporal allocation would argue for a lower
rate lest we allocate too few resources to the future.27 After discussing these
issues, William Baumol concludes that the use of a low discount rate by the
government would lead to investments with meager long-term returns
compared to those available for investments in private businesses."
25. Morrall used this approach to avoid the task of specifying the monetary value of a saved
life, which is a controversial step of all cost-benefit analyses. See Morrall, supra note 2, at 31.
26. Before denouncing Morrall for his choice, one must remember that he was an OMB
employee at the time that he wrote his 1986 article and that the then-current OMB guidelines
called for the use of a 10% discount rate for all cost-benefit studies. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
& BUDGET, ExEcuTivE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-94 REVISED 4 (1972). OMB
has now lowered its recommended discount rate to 7%. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT &
BUDGET, EXECUTiVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-94 REVISED 8.b.1 (1992).
Nonetheless, it is certainly legitimate to question whether even this rate is too high, as others have
done. See, e.g., Daniel Farber & Paul Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates,
Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267, 270 (1993).
27. Imagine a choice between a public investment that would generate a 2% return and a
private investment of the same magnitude that would yield an 8% return. It is conceivable that the
tax revenue generated by the private investment would outweigh the return from the public
investment. While the private investment would clearly seem to dominate the public investment in
this case, the adoption of a very low social rate of discount might channel resources from such
private use to the less valuable public use.
28. See William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 788, 801
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Heinzerling gives little weight to Baumol's concern.
Heinzerling does quote and endorse Baumol's suggestion that a lower
or perhaps zero discount rate may be appropriate in certain circumstances,
such as when the goal is to prevent irreversible environmental damage.29
But Baumol's suggested special treatment to avoid irreversible disastrous
consequences was to subsidize selectively the investments needed to
address them. He specifically rejected Heinzerling's resort to "a low
general discount rate that encourages indiscriminately all sorts of
investment programs whether or not they are relevant." 30
One may think of regulatory policy as requiring two fundamental
decisions: (1) the determination of the amount of resources that society will
spend to save (and enhance) lives; and (2) the determination of how those
resources should be spent on particular life-saving regulations or
expenditures. My guess is that Heinzerling hopes that her criticism of
discounting might lead society to spend more money on lifesaving
measures. Heinzerling argues that since it is worse to have underestimated a
risk than to have overestimated it, we should be sure to use high-end
estimates of the benefits of regulation.3"
But while it is nice to be on the side of the angels, we cannot overlook
the fact that overregulation has costs too. Individuals spend their own
money on reducing risks, and if regulation drives up costs sufficiently to
reduce personal income, then some of these personal health and safety
investments will be displaced. If we overinvest in regulations that have
dubious value, we may save some lives through the direct regulation, but
lose even more from the foregone future investments in health that we have
crowded out.32 Moreover, by failing to use a discount rate, we will
encourage spending on projects that have distant payoffs. If the goal is to
save more lives, one should instead ratchet up the monetary estimate of
how much society is willing to spend to save a life. If inadequate measures
are being taken to save lives when, say, $5 million is the estimated value,
one can raise the monetary estimate to some higher figure.33
(1968) ("It is my inclination at the moment to look with some favor at a figure toward the higher
end of the range-at a discount rate closer to what may be considered the cost of capital to private
firms. My grounds for this preference are hardly convincing even to me-they rest largely on the
feeling that there is a very tangible loss in the transfer of resources from a high rate of return use
to an employment in which their yield is very low.").
29. See Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 2052 (quoting Baumol, supra note 28, at 801).
30. See Baumol, supra note 28, at 801.
31. See Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 2044-45.
32. Recall that spending $5 million today to save a life in the distant future requires foregoing
(1) the option of saving a life today for $5 million and (2) the option of investing that $5 million,
which will grow to a much higher sum that can save many more lives in the future. This is the
sense in which dollars and lives become commensurable, since if you have the dollars you can
save lives.
33. Similarly, Heinzerling questions the argument that the greater wealth of future
generations implies that we should discount future benefits. She replies that the richer generations
19071999]
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In the end, there is no single appropriate discount rate. Uncertainty is
inherent in the choice of a discount rate, and a range of rates should be
employed. 4 Of course, the use of differing discount rates implies that
judgment will have to be exercised when the resulting cost-benefit
calculations lead to conflicting conclusions.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the latest OMB guidelines on cost-benefit analysis emphasize, there
is no "mechanistic blueprint" for policy evaluation." Rather, "[c]ompetent
professional judgment is indispensable for the preparation of a high-quality
analysis." 36 Rigorous probing of cost and benefit estimates (of the sort that
Heinzerling directs at Morrall's table) can help refine and improve
regulatory studies. Heinzerling's recommendations to jettison the valuable
tools of discounting and cost-benefit analysis, however, would leave policy
to be influenced more by rhetoric rather than by reason. This is an ancient
debate that was at the heart of Plato's dialogue, Gorgias, in which Socrates
argued for expertise to guide policy while his opponents, Gorgias and
Callicles, sought to rely on rhetoric.37 Here, I side with Plato and Socrates.
While Heinzerling's anti-discounting rhetoric may be moving, it has the
untoward consequence of making it seem that those who would be saving
lives by appropriate regulatory decisionmaking are harsh and callous
because they "discount lives." Yet no one suggests that lives should be
discounted in the popular meaning of that term--devalued or disregarded.
Proper discounting can aid in the important process of channeling resources
to their highest-valued uses, which can promote greater health and well-
being for both present and future generations. The fact that some
policymakers, such as Al Gore, have denounced the practice of discounting
raises concerns over whether these judgments will be made wisely."6
The Western capitalist countries have benefited greatly by their ability
to invest private capital in efficient ways-that is, by investing in projects
whose cost is exceeded by the present value of future income streams. The
will therefore value life more. See Heinzerling, supra note 6, at 2044-45. But it seems illogical to
argue that because future generations will have more money than we do at present, we (who are
poorer) should spend more to save one life in the future than to save one present life.
34. See ARROW Er AL., supra note 14, at 13.
35. 1996 OMB ANALYSIS, supra note 20, at 3.
36. Id.
37. See PLATO, GORGrAs 28-32 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books 1960).
38. See ALBERT GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 190-91
(1992).
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resulting increased wealth has greatly enhanced the health and longevity of
the citizens of these countries. When government considers spending
resources on health-improving measures it must be mindful that its
expenditures may curtail private wealth-creating investments and personal
expenditures on health-promotion and lifesaving. If high-return private
investments are crowded out by low-return governmental expenditures, the
government may be lowering social wealth, health, and well-being. Since
discount rates are an important policing mechanism for determining
profitable investments, they must be a concern of governmental
decisionmakers who care about the aggregate well-being of the populace.
In general, the governmental interest in determining what people are
willing to pay to extend their lives is premised on the belief that if a citizen
is to pay (through taxation) for a governmentally provided life-extending
measure, then it is helpful to know whether he would willingly spend the
money himself to achieve a similar health benefit. If he would prefer having
the money to getting the benefit, it may be unwise to tax him to give him a
benefit that he values less than the tax revenue. This explains why more can
be taken from and therefore spent on benefiting the rich-since they are
happy to spend more on extending their lives. A far less affluent person
would likely pray that the government would not tax him to spend the same
amount that the rich man would pay for life extension, since the poorer
individual would generally prefer the money. The less affluent person
would certainly not want to be taxed highly to make the rich healthier. This
discussion may suggest the error in Heinzerling's suggestion that because
future generations will be richer, we must spend more on saving their lives.
No. We, who are poorer, will not value the lives of the future rich more
highly simply because they will be rich. Just as today's poor will not spend
enormous amounts to promote the health of today's rich (or entreat the
government to tax them to do so), the relatively poor of today (vis-4-vis the
citizens of the future) will not want the government to tax them to provide
extraordinary lifesaving benefits for richer future generations.
Heinzerling makes the point that financial rates of return, and hence
discount rates, have nothing to do with judgments about the relative worth
of present and future people (p.1914)." I am happy to accept this statement
as long as "worth" is thought of in a spiritual, ethical, or religious sense.
This discussion may suggest the basis for my disagreement with the view
that future benefits-and especially future lives-are without moral or
ethical value simply because their discounted present value approaches
zero. For example, I do not spend a lot of time worrying about the welfare
of my neighbor's children even though I am constantly concerned about the
39. Parenthetical page references are to Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J.
1911 (1999).
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welfare of my own children. In the narrow sense that Heinzerling employs,
one might say that I "devalue the life of these other children relative to my
own" since I spend nothing to improve their welfare. But I reject the idea
that my children are in any ultimate moral or ethical sense more valuable
than my neighbor's children. I do not have to spend time worrying about
my neighbor's children because my neighbor can take care of them just
fine, and I apply the same thinking, absent exceptional circumstances, to
distant future generations. I am not willing to spend a lot of money to help
very remote future generations, because I think they will be just fine
without my concern and resources-indeed, there is every reason to think
that their lives will be far more pleasant than those of the current
generation. Discounting gives a rational method for trading off the
expenditures across generations, but as I noted in my discussion of the
appropriate discount rate, in special circumstances where the interests of the
future generation are such that my stated assumption is inaccurate, then one
might depart from the general approach and choose to favor future
generations by using a low or even zero discount rate, or subsidizing an
important investment. This type of special treatment might be appropriate
in the case of some irreversible environmental damage, much as my attitude
towards the welfare of my neighbor's children would be changed if my
neighbor could not for some reason take care of them.
I disagree with Heinzerling's views on (1) the significance of the
increasing cost of lifesaving technologies (p. 1911), which I believe confuse
the difference between real and nominal; (2) the indivisibility of lives
(p.19 13), which are in fact temporally quite divisible since no life is ever
saved-only days or years of life are saved; (3) the conception that the
timing of the benefit of a reduction in risk is immediate even if the savings
of life-years occurs far in the future (p. 1913), which can irrationally favor
less effective lifesaving technologies; and (4) her notion that the central
issues of discount rate determination are "dated" (even though her
proffered list of supposedly up-to-date considerations includes merely
reformulations or refinements of the central issues) or even irrelevant to the
issues of government regulation (p. 1914).
Of course, anomalies will necessarily be present in any exercise of
public decisionmaking, but I would submit that a rigorously documented
cost-benefit analysis can illuminate the issues of relevance in assessing the
impact on aggregate welfare of a particular project or regulation. This
means neither that one must be a slave to such an analysis nor that
distributive or deontological considerations never trump the analysis, but
that, as a pragmatic matter, the general use of cost-benefit analysis, though
certainly no panacea, probably promotes the general welfare by
systematically leading to better decisions than would be achieved through
ad hoc evaluations.
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